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Executive Summary 
This review seeks to provide lessons to DFID and other stakeholders in the design of 
future pooled funds and coordinated delivery mechanisms, by drawing on the 
experience of the Basic Services Fund in South Sudan 20016-2012. It is not a 
comprehensive study: the results of many valuable lessons are available from the 
BSF web site1. 
 
BSF was launched in 2005, the year Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) was signed, and has been managed by BMB Mott Macdonald since 2006.  
What began as a short-term bridging fund to deliver basic services in health, 
education and WASH over 20 months has been renewed with a succession of short-
term extensions, to the end of 2012.  
 
Over this period, in a context where other programmes have been seen to struggle, 
BSF has developed a reputation for delivering outputs on the ground.  
 
The review drew on external reviews and learning exercises conducted by BSF, and 
enquiries in November 2012, to research 7 areas of evidence, as shown below, 
generating lessons from BSF experience for the future. 
 
Evidence Areas… … generating Lessons from BSF experience for the Future 
 
 
 
 
1. Stakeholders 
 
Lessons Identified 
 
 
•  
What did 
stakeholders come to 
realize was 
important, or needed 
to be addressed, that 
had not been known 
at the outset?  
 
How did these 
understandings 
change and develop 
over time? 
Extent to which 
addressed within 
BSF 
 
To what extent was 
BSF able to address 
these issues, and 
how? 
 
What were the 
issues that BSF was 
not able to resolve, 
or that may have 
been beyond the 
programmes’ 
scope? 
Lessons for the 
Future 
 
 
What has BSF 
demonstrated, that 
could usefully be 
incorporated in 
future programme 
design or 
implementation? 
 
What remaining 
challenges should 
future programmes 
try to address? 
2. From Relief to 
Development  
 
3. Conflict 
4. Gender 
5. Performance 
6. Value for Money 
7. Sustainability 
 
The findings of these are set in the main report. A summary of the main lessons 
follows this Executive Summary. 
 
The report suggests a framework for considering funding Mechanisms, including  
• The social, political and economic Landscape in which they operate 
• The Funding Mechanism itself 
• 3 key areas in which the funding mechanism needs to succeed 
• Engaged Stakeholders 
• Performance for Outcomes 
• Sustainability 
  
                                                
1 See Annex 4: Key documents  
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The Landscape 
 
The social political and economic landscape for BSF and for many funds is insecurity 
and uncertainty, as well as hope and opportunity. The social legacy of conflict, 
neglect, poverty and expropriation of resources is complex and severe.  
 
In this landscape, the growth of services and the capacity to deliver them is 
constrained by a host of factors, and their design requires deep understanding to 
respond appropriately to the specificity of problems.  
 
1. Programme development should be informed by analysis of the specific 
drivers of conflict, and should address the problems arising from conflict.  
 
2. Programme development should be informed by analysis of those population 
groups suffering particular exclusion and with specific service needs, for 
instance because of gender, disability, culture or poverty; for instance, gender 
analysis should include a baseline of women and girls’ need and concerns, 
including gender based violence, and should address issues of women’s 
ownership of service design and delivery.  
 
Funding Mechanisms 
 
Funding mechanisms are positioned between relief and development, sometimes 
leaning more to relief, sometimes more toward development. Their position is 
influenced by their objectives, design, stakeholders and length of operation.  
 
Programme design cannot presume that society is making a one-way transition from 
a “relief” environment to a “development” environment. It needs to be able to adapt to 
setbacks such as renewed insecurity. 
 
BSF demonstrated that short-term programmes can deliver service outputs. 
However, the short-term nature of the programme reduced the scope of the 
programme to develop local capacity to lead and sustain these.  
 
3. Funding mechanisms need a clear theory of change2 that shows how they will 
achieve their planned outcomes and outputs within the period of funding, and 
how they will adapt to setbacks in development. The theory needs to show 
not only achievable outcomes for service delivery; it also needs achievable 
outcomes for institutional capacity development. 
 
Engaged Stakeholders 
 
BSF shows that stakeholders can be engaged even in relief mode. Engagement 
of stakeholders cannot be contingent on a high level of developed structures, 
which are subject to setbacks and delays. They therefore need to help 
stakeholders build capacity and structures step-by step. 
 
4. Funding mechanisms need to work within the strengths and constraints of all 
stakeholders, including emergent structures of government.   
                                                
2 A “Theory of Change” tests whether the processes, institutions and assumptions behind a 
development intervention are adequate to achieve its purpose. See Vogel I, “Review of the 
use of ‘Theory of Change’ in international development”, DFID 2012 
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5. Funding mechanisms need to work towards fulfilling Government aspirations 
for control, whilst managing the inherent risks to service delivery and Value 
for Money.  
 
6. Funding mechanisms therefore need to evolve explicit enabling steps to 
achieve the competencies and structures required for transfer of ownership, 
strategic and operational decision-making, and budgetary control, from the 
funder and NGOs, to local stakeholders. 
 
Performance for Outcomes 
 
BSF demonstrated strong performance in delivering outputs. However, 
whether short-term or long-term, performance needs to focus on outcomes as 
well as outputs.  
 
The costs of short-term programmes remain high because it is hard for funds to 
address major cost drivers, such as skill shortages, inefficient supply chains, 
inappropriate materials, and duplicated management systems. Only strategic 
investment over the longer term can drive these costs down. 
 
7. A funding mechanism’s theory of change needs to show how performance in 
outputs of service translate into achievable and clearly measured outcomes 
 
8. Performance assessment needs to embrace capacity development as fully as 
service delivery. 
 
9. Funding mechanisms need to demonstrate the economic benefits of their 
outcomes, in order to assess value for money. 
 
10. Funding mechanisms need to make longer term investments to break out of 
the high costs of short-term programmes. They need to address major cost 
drivers, particularly in human resources, supply chains, development 
technologies, and duplication of management. 
 
Sustainability 
 
BSF has demonstrated that even in challenging circumstances well-designed 
projects can promote engagement, ownership and sustainability, particularly 
at the local level. It has been hard, however, to set realistic exit strategies and 
handover plans within the timeframe of funding. 
 
11. Funds need to identify realistic and sustainable resources for the future of the 
structures and services they have funded, by identifying public sources of 
funding and building the capacity of community institutions  
 
12. Funds need to put less reliance on exit strategies, and more emphasis on 
staged development processes of local capacity throughout the programme.  
 
13. Predictability and continuity of funding for basic services is essential for 
sustainability. Uncertainty risks loss of services, capacity and learning. 
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Lessons for the Future – A Summary 
Stakeholder Engagement 
BSF demonstrates 
• BSF has demonstrated a sustained commitment to engagement with 
Government and other stakeholders at all levels, from the secretariat of the 
Steering Committee to the work of NGOs with local health and education 
committees. This has achieved important if limited improvements in 
ownership, planning, management and operations.  
Additional challenges 
• Programmes need to accept and work within the strengths and constraints of 
all stakeholders, including emergent structures of government 
• Funding mechanisms need to evolve explicit steps to achieve a gradual 
transfer of ownership, strategic and operational decision-making, and 
budgetary control from the funder and NGOs, to both national and local 
government bodies, elected representatives and other local stakeholders. 
• Support for stakeholder development must be supported by adequate 
resources, including staff and non-staff budgets, and technical support, in 
order for local government to participate effectively.  
From Relief to Development 
BSF demonstrates 
• Services can be delivered on the ground, often in very challenging 
circumstances, using a mix of NNGOs or INGOs with large contingents of 
local staff, working in collaboration with embryonic local government at county 
and state level.  
• Such approaches can be swift, effective and cost-effective. 
• More developmental approaches require longer term programmes than are 
feasible with short-term funding.  
Additional Challenges 
• As well as ensuring effective delivery, funding mechanisms need to provide 
deeper support for Government capacity than training staff within inherently 
weak Government systems 
• Even short-term funds can allocate a percentage of funds for short 
developmental steps. 
• Funding partners need to acknowledge Government aspirations for control, 
whilst managing the inherent risks to service delivery and VfM.  
• Funds must be able to respond to unforeseen interruptions and reversals in 
capacity development, and not allow these to frustrate the commitment to 
service delivery or capacity development. 
• Long-term predictable funding is a pre-condition for working towards 
Government aspirations, and for transforming fragmented and supply-driven 
services into a strategic response to need.  
Conflict 
BSF demonstrates 
• Close support to NGOs with strong local experience has enabled BSF to 
deliver sensitively designed projects responding to the needs of IDPs and 
host populations without causing or exacerbating conflict.  
Additional Challenges 
• Programmes should be informed by a deep analysis of the specific drivers of 
conflict in the particular context, and should include indicators of progress in 
 Learning from BSF  DRAFT  28 December 2012  v 
conflict prevention and peacebuilding 
• Programmes should respond to problems arising from conflict, such as 
gender-based violence, needs of former child soldiers, mental health and 
interrupted education.  
Gender 
BSF demonstrates 
• BSF has delivered a ‘general good’ in health, education, and WASH, which 
broadly benefits women and girls, and has demonstrated gender sensitive 
practices in programme delivery.  
Additional challenges 
• Programme design should be informed by in-depth gender analysis, including 
a baseline of women and girls’ needs and resources, their access to services, 
employment and engagement in decision-making.  
• Programme design should address issues of women’s ownership of service 
design and delivery. 
• Programmes should use gender-specific measures of outcome, service 
delivery, employment and engagement. 
Performance  
BSF demonstrates 
• Despite insecurity and many other obstacles, BSF has achieved a productive 
and responsive grant-making process, delivering substantial volumes of 
service output. To achieve this, it has been efficient, flexible, responsive, 
resourceful and prompt; it has also been exacting in its requirements of 
service providers. 
• The BSF approach has merits as a realistic way of maximising outputs, in the 
transition from relief to development.  
Additional Challenges 
• Funds need a clear theory of change, and indicators that show how output 
performance (facilities built, training completed) translates into positive 
outcomes. 
• The assessment of performance needs to embrace capacity development as 
fully as service delivery  
• Strategies for service delivery need to represent appropriate responses to the 
scale of local and national demand 
Value for money 
BSF Demonstrates 
• Funding mechanisms can provide Value for Money, even within the 
constraints of short-term funding and difficult conditions, by using an efficient 
provider with reducing overheads, committed to cost effectiveness and the 
quality of its own service to NGOs  
Additional Challenges 
• Funding mechanisms need to demonstrate the economic benefits of their 
outcomes. 
• Funding mechanisms need to make longer term investments to break out of 
the high costs incurred by short-term programmes. They need to work with 
their partners in government and service delivery to address major cost 
drivers through, e.g.  
• Human resource interventions to address skill shortages;  
• Reform of supply chains to provide reliable and affordable equipment and 
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supplies;  
• Investment in technologies that maximize use of sustainable local 
resources and “software”, rather than standard solutions used by relief 
programmes 
• Reducing duplication of management by integrating the fund within 
national and local government  
• Increasing direct contracting by local NGOs and other local suppliers. 
Sustainability 
BSF demonstrates 
• Funding mechanisms can demonstrate good practice in helping NGOs and 
projects promote sustainability at local level, but the extent of success is 
unknown. 
Additional Challenges 
• Funds need to identify realistic and sustainable resources for the future of the 
structures and services they have funded, by identifying public sources of 
funding and building the capacity of community institutions  
• Funds need to put less reliance on exit strategies, and more emphasis on 
staged development processes of local capacity throughout the programme. .  
• Predictability and continuity of funding for basic services is essential for 
sustainability. Uncertainty risks loss of services, capacity and learning. 
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1 Introduction 
This review seeks to provide lessons to DFID and other stakeholders, in South 
Sudan and other countries, in the design of future pooled funds and coordinated 
delivery mechanisms. It draws on the experience of the Basic Services Fund in 
South Sudan 2006-2012, and may be most relevant to countries experiencing or 
recovering from conflict. It is not a comprehensive study: the results of many valuable 
lessons are available from BSF3.  
 
BSF was launched in 2005, the same year in which the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) was signed, with the first meeting of the BSF Steering Committee 
(Rumbek, 28th October 2005). This was the outcome of a series of workshops 
beginning in 2004, that drew together the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement 
(SPLM), Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), together with the United Nations and donor representatives, to discuss how 
best to support basic services provision for the Southern Sudan. At the time, BSF 
was seen as a short-term bridging fund, prior to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) 
coming on stream.  
 
BMB Mott McDonald (MM) was appointed as the Service Provider for BSF on 19th 
August 2006, taking over management of the first round of NGO contracts from 
DFID.  In 2010, DFID re-appointed MM after a second international tender for the 
BSF fund manager of BSF-Interim Arrangement (BSF-IA), which was again extended 
(BSF-IA extension) for a final year, in 2012. In this way, what began as a short-term 
bridging fund to deliver basic services, was carried through a series of further short-
term extensions, ultimately enduring for nearly seven years. 
 
Over this period, in a context where other programmes have been seen to struggle, 
BSF has developed a reputation for having delivered outputs on the ground, often in 
difficult and challenging circumstances – even though the scope of these outputs 
may have been relatively narrow, and each successive funding period relatively 
short. 
 
The purpose of this review is to: ‘provide lessons to DFID and other stakeholders in 
the design of future pooled funds and coordinated delivery mechanisms, taking 
account of evidence on: 
 
1. the interaction with a range of different stakeholders including bodies of the 
Government of the Republic of South Sudan in the design and 
implementation of the Programme 
 
2. how far the historical design and implementation of the programme has 
supported the transition from relief to development, specifically the 
systems strengthening component 
 
 
3. whether the Programme ‘did no harm’ in geographical areas prone to conflict 
 
                                                
3 See Annex 4: Key documents for examples of learning exercises undertaking by and for 
BSF, or the BSF website, www.bsf-south-sudan.org 
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4. the gender sensitivity of the Programme 
 
 
5. Programme performance in meeting targets; accomplishing key objectives; 
and achieving intended programme impact. This will include reasons for over- 
r under-performance. 
 
6. the value for money achieved by the Programme 
 
7. the sustainability of BSF supported facilities and systems following the 
conclusion of BSF support’4 
 
The period considered by this ‘lesson learning’ exercise spans the inception of BSF-1 
(2006) to the mid-term point (30th June 2012) of the third extension, known as BSF- 
Interim Arrangement extension (BSF-IAe).  
1.1 Method 
The review draws primarily on existing analyses, particularly, but not limited to: 
External Reviews of BSF (2008, 2009, 2011), a series of learning exercises 
conducted by or on behalf of BSF between 2008 and 2012 and the BSF programme 
design documents and reports (See Annex 4: Key documents).   
 
Consultations were carried out over 5 days in November 2012 in South Sudan, with 
particular emphasis on conferring with those involved with the programme from its 
inception, including: 
o Steering Committee member institutions;  
o Government of South Sudan (GoSS) line ministries at State and 
County levels;  
o DFID and co-donors;  
o stakeholders engaged in the design of the BSF and MDTF 
o NGOs engaged in programme design and delivery 
 
Fieldwork took place in two counties (Aweil East, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and 
Malakal, Upper Nile) where BSF projects have been provided, to meet with state, 
county and other stakeholders, and in Juba, to meet with national and funder 
stakeholders. 
 
Questionnaires were sent to all 37 NGOs reported as funded by BSF (and 14 
responses were received). Questionnaires were additionally sent to stakeholders 
who were unable to meet the consultants. 
 
Group discussions included 
• Discussions with District, County and NGO representatives in the counties 
selected 
• Discussion with NGO Health Forum representatives 
• Review meeting with BSF Steering Committee 
 
The review was carried out by 3 evaluators, covering Health, Education, and 
WATSAN, with fieldwork carried out by Health and Education evaluators only.   
 
For each of the seven evidence areas identified in the Terms of Reference, the 
                                                
4 Terms of Reference: Objects (p1) 
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review team focused upon three themes 
1. lessons identified through the BSF programme 
2. the extent tp which these were addressed within BSF 
3. the lessons available for future programmes. 
 
Evidence Areas… … generating Lessons from BSF experience for the Future 
1. Stakeholders  Lessons Identified 
 
What did stakeholders 
come to realize was 
important, or needed to 
be addressed, that had 
not been known at the 
outset?  
 
How did these 
understandings change 
and develop over time? 
Extent to which 
addressed within 
BSF 
 
To what extent was 
BSF able to 
address these 
issues, and how? 
 
What were the issues 
that BSF was not able 
to resolve, or that may 
have been beyond the 
programmes’ scope? 
Lessons for the 
Future 
 
What has BSF 
demonstrated, that 
could usefully be 
incorporated in future 
programme design or 
implementation? 
 
What remaining 
challenges should 
future programmes try 
to address? 
2. From Relief to 
Development  
3. Conflict 
4. Gender 
5. Performance 
6. Value for Money 
7. Sustainability 
 
Terminology  
Project and Programme 
From the perspective of this review, BSF is a Programme, combining a group of 
projects. Each of BSF’s contracts with an NGO as a “project”. 
 
However, from the perspective of DFID, BSF is just one project in a larger national 
and global programme. It refers to BSF as a “project” both in the ToR for this review, 
and in the term  “Project Memorandum”.  
Outcome and Outputs 
This review distinguishes between outcomes and outputs.  
Outcomes are the changes or benefits that result from the project or programme. So, 
improved health or improved literacy are outcomes.  
 
Outputs are the specific, direct deliverables of a project or programme, for instance 
the number of classrooms built or the volume of service delivered. Outputs provide 
the conditions necessary to achieve the Outcome. 
 
This use of the terms outcomes and outputs follows current DFID usage5. Previously, 
DFID referred to “purpose” with a similar meaning to “outcome”. 
 
The “impact” of the project or programme is its contribution to a wider change, often 
at a national level. So, an outcome of improved health in children under 5 in the 
project area, contributes to a wider impact of achieving of the Millennium 
Development Goals.   
  
                                                
5 Guidance on using the revised Logical Framework, DFID How to note, DFID 2011 
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2 BSF in Context 
2.1 Historical context 
For two centuries, the history of Southern Sudan has been bound up with the 
struggle by local and international parties for economic and ideological dominance 
over Africa, the Middle East and each other.6 During this period, South Sudan, and 
indeed all parts of the Sudan region, have experienced conflicts, population 
movements, slavery, epidemics, economic collapse and simple neglect. There is no 
single author for these misfortunes, though Ottoman, Egyptian, and British interests 
have played their part, as have the dominance of some Northern tribes, and the 
pursuit of Arab, religious and nationalist ideologies. 
 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, providing a basis for peace between 
north and south, and the creation of an independent and secular state, has to be 
seen in this context. Its peace is not absolute, as indicated by the recent conflict 
between Sudan and South Sudan over oil resources in Abyei. Nor is there a 
complete resolution of all Sudan’s geographical disputes in Darfur and Nuba 
Mountains. Nor is there complete peace between and within the many Dinka, 
Shillook, Nuer and other tribes of the South. 
 
While the security of peace remains uncertain, the socio-economic legacy of the 
period is more definite: recurrent domination and neglect, warfare and expropriation 
of human and natural resources have resulted in a poverty of economy, services and 
human development well documented elsewhere. It would be over-optimistic to 
assert that these are solely problems of the past: in 2012, South Sudan has had to 
deal with internal and external disputes, arrival of over 100,000 displaced people, 
and the collapse of revenue following the suspension of oil flows. 
2.2 History of BSF: a succession of bridges 
Each phase of BSF has been seen as a temporary bridge to a more permanent, 
strategic or developmental solution to the provision of basic services and building 
underlying capacity for these. 
 
Stakeholder discussions involving SPLM, NGOs, CSOs, the United Nations, donors 
and other service delivery stakeholders to consider the establishment of basic 
services began in 2004. BSF was intended as a bridging fund, building on services 
provided by NGOs during the civil war and pending establishment of a Multi-Donor 
Trust Fund (MDTF) and a more strategic approach to public service. Over 80% of 
primary health services in South Sudan’s rural areas were widely reported to be 
supported by NGOs or Faith Based Organisations.  
 
After an initial selection round, DFID appointed BMB Mott Macdonald (MM) as 
Service Provider of the fund in 2006. BSF was extended into BSF-2. MM won a 
second tender to manage the BSF-Interim Arrangement (BSF-IA) in 2010. This was 
again extended in 20127. 
 
GRSS and DFID decided to extend BSF-IA to provide a further bridge to future 
funding mechanisms for primary health services funded by BSF. This was intended 
to avoid loss of staff and assets.  
 
                                                
6 See Annex 3: Southern Sudan Timeline 
7 See Annex 7: BSF Phases, financial envelope and dates 
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Although BSF’s purpose has always been to expand the coverage, quality and use of 
basic services, this was refined to focus on primary health care, education, and 
water, sanitation and hygiene to communities recovering from conflict in BSF-2 and 
BSF-IA. BSF-IAe primarily focused on health: existing education projects were 
funded through to completion; and no new WASH interventions were approved apart 
from components of health and education projects.8  
  
                                                
8 See Annex 6: Evolution of Logical Framework of BSF Programmes  
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Findings 
3 Stakeholder Engagement 
3.1 Lessons identified 
BSF has sought to engage with GRSS at all levels. It identified the importance of 
MOFEP’s Aid Coordination Directorate, whose Director has chaired the BSF Steering 
Committee, the prime instrument for BSF to engage Government at the programme 
level. However, the Steering Committee was found to have a limited role: having 
selected partner NGOs in 2008, there were few subsequent strategic or operational 
decisions made by the Steering Committee, and therefore little sense of ownership 
by GRSS.  
 
BSF has also always wanted projects to engage with and be accountable to 
beneficiaries and their communities as well as with emerging government structures 
at all levels.  
 
However, at both the programme and the project levels, government resource 
limitations have made engagement and accountability difficult.  
 
BSF has also engaged with all the development partners supporting the BSF, 
(Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Canada and the European Union) though in most 
cases, donors have expected DFID to have the primary involvement, as the 
designated Lead Donor. 
 
BSF and reviewers, as well as GoSS itself, have sought a wider role for Government 
than just a formal committee presence. 2008 Review recommended that the Steering 
Committee should contribute more to management, implementation and policy as 
one of the ways that lessons from BSF should be transferred to GoSS. Likewise, the 
2009 review proposed that BSF take the initiative to provide more informal briefings9. 
In BSF 2, BSF proposed to support capacity building at state and county level, and 
mentoring of local NGOs by INGOs 10 , improving ownership by engaging 
stakeholders and imparting “to” them the lessons of BSF.  
3.1.1 Health 
BSF has always sought to work with the Ministry of Health, though involvement has 
been limited in practice. The Steering Committee frequently meets without MoH 
representation, although primary health is the largest sector of BSF work. A health 
sub-committee of the Steering Committee was established in 2010, but has met 
infrequently.  
 
BSF has sought and used guidance from MOHS, particularly the 2009 Basic 
Package of Health Services (BPHS), although in practice its specification of “basic” 
services was so wide that it was widely regarded as unrealistic. 
 
BSF increasingly saw State Ministry and County Health Department ownership as 
essential to the transfer of planning monitoring and management of service provision. 
BSF has been aware of the problem for CHDs of working with large numbers of 
health NGOs with low accountability. BSF has sought to support CHDs, to bring 
                                                
9 BSF Review 2009 
10 Project Memorandum BSF-2 
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NGOs together into more local accountable frameworks, and to reduce the number 
of NGOs in each county. However, resources for CHDs, including public health, 
management and supervision skills, and budgets for staffing, housing, and transport 
have all been major problems. 
 
Community ownership was also important to BSF 11 but Boma Health Committees 
had a stronger role in the management of the lowest level Primary Health Care Units 
(PHCUs) than the larger Primary Health Care Centres (PHCC), and were more 
engaged with the maintenance of the physical facility and to some extent community 
health education, than with wider management. 
 
Ownership is not solely through direct state management. The  role of non-state 
providers in health needs further analysis in South Sudan. Church-supported health 
facilities, some supported by BSF, have a long tradition, and are likely to continue as 
a component of the health system. Other private sector providers, from local 
druggists to urban providers also need consideration. 
3.1.2 Education  
BSF established joint mechanisms for planning and monitoring with education 
stakeholders, including:  
• Monthly Education Co-ordination Meetings allowing all stakeholders to share 
challenges, and identify solutions collaboratively.  
• Quarterly narrative reports from education partners to BSF. 
 
Interviews and BSF Reviews show that through BSF, NGOs and State and County 
MoEs have been able to collaborate and work together well in:  
• identifying sites for school construction,  
• selecting teachers for training, and  
• Monitoring and evaluating construction and training, through joint fieldwork. 
 
State and County MoE representatives unanimously report a strong sense of 
participation and ownership over the allocation of resources for school construction. 
For each construction site, a joint Project Technical Unit was established, comprising 
of: 
• An MoE construction engineer 
• An NGO construction engineer 
• The local construction contractor 
 
The Project Technical Unit carried out site visits, before and during construction, 
agreeing any necessary adaptations to the standard government design (e.g. in 
response to local soil and climate conditions, risk of flooding, typical day-time 
temperatures), and maximising the involvement and ownership of the community, 
through:  
• identifying / providing an appropriate construction site,  
• clearing the site ready for construction,  
• contributing local construction materials (e.g. sand), and 
• in some instances, contributing labour to construction, e.g. digging 
latrines, putting up fences. 
 
The early and pro-active engagement of the community was a pre-requisite for 
                                                
11 Peer Review 2009, BSF Review 2008 
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school construction through BSF, intended to increase subsequent ownership of the 
school through the PTA.  
 
But there was also acknowledgement that all education partners wanted to develop 
MoE capacity, particularly at county level, to participate fully and more autonomously 
in  
• Monitoring and inspection, and  
• Delivery of training. 
 
At present, State or County MoEs’ involvement is severely hampered by the lack of 
budget to support field visits, although there have been some improvements in the 
involvement of County Education Officers in training delivery. 
3.1.3 WASH 
At national level, BSF established good working relationships with MWRI and 
contributed training and other inputs to improve performance in the sector.  MWRI 
officials were always offered the opportunity to accompany BSF staff on field trips, 
but were constrained by funding for this.12 Engagement at state and lower levels of 
government has also been accomplished by BSF and the NGOS, although it is 
seriously constrained by lack of staffing at lower tiers of government13.  Early in BSF 
it was limited to information-sharing and consultation rather than co-planning14. 
 
The BSF Review 2011 found that “capacity building generally consists of involvement 
of the local government staff in the selection of project villages, field visits, monitoring 
and short-term training, and in some case, provision of equipment”. 
 
The engagement of communities in developing water supplies leading to “ownership” 
has been variable. For example, for installation of water points often sites were 
selected without consultation with communities, so possibly decreasing the chances 
of usage and of building good provider/user relations and associated accountability 
mechanisms15. 
3.2 Extent to which these were addressed by BSF 
BSF has not been able to enhance ownership by national or local stakeholders as 
much as it would like.  
 
Although BSF is accountable through the Steering Committee, and established sub-
committees for education, WASH and health from 2010 there is a clear view that 
GoSS is still not “driving the car” by directing the flow of BSF aid which is properly 
the property of the people of South Sudan.  
 
This reflects a structural reality of BSF funding:  
 
• BSF provides for the transfer of funds from BSF to NGOs, rather than directly 
to government. This process is on a “parallel” track to government, so 
transferring “ownership” from the NGO to a local community or government 
requires a deliberate strategy to move funding and control, probably by 
stages, from the BSF track to GRSS 
                                                
12 BSF Review 2011 
13 BSF Review 2009 
14 BSF Review 2008 
15 Cleaver 2011 
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• Programme design is primarily “supply-led”, based on the offers put forward 
by NGOs. Both BSF and the NGOs they fund have been mentioned by local 
officials showing better practice than many NGO, particularly “relief” NGOs,  
that come and go without engagement or authorisation by local authorities. 
BSF has ensured that  NGOs conduct needs assessments, take account of 
sector development plans, and also obtain approval from the appropriate 
authorities. Even so, their plans are not primarily driven by demands from 
County State or Federal levels.  
 
• The short duration of each BSF fund has made it difficult for the Steering 
Committee to set strategic objectives beyond the current or at most the next 
funding round. 
 
The lack of ownership also reflects the fact that national and local structures have not 
evolved to the degree and in the manner to allow BSF to transfer management and 
resources in the manner that it may have envisaged. BSF correctly identifies key 
factors that would have to have been built up to achieve this ownership: M&E 
frameworks, comprehensive budgets, control of payroll and staff incentives 
3.2.1 Health 
BSF has supported NGOs where possible in engagement with County Health 
Departments and other government bodies, providing technical and management 
support, transport, supervision, including in some cases a dedicated officer from the 
NGO16. But CHDs remain seriously short of skills and resources. Only 9 out of 31 
Counties reported receiving a visit from the State MoH in 2012.  
 
However, establishing or transforming CHDs was always beyond the scope of BSF, 
and the training and other resources provided by NGOs under BSF grants have been 
relatively minor. CHDs and NGOs have expressed frustration that they were unable 
to achieve the effective transfer of ownership to community and local government.  
 
Despite what both may wish, NGOs are still the budget holders for facilities, rather 
than CHDs; and these contracts are for provision of selected facilities, rather than for 
the population of the whole county. Practice falls short of a population-based model, 
whereby the governmental stakeholders, at each tier of government, deploy either 
public or private providers to provide clinical and public health services that meet the 
needs of the whole beneficiary population. Yet, while CHD capacities and systems 
for managing facilities, supplies and staff remain so limited, the model of ownership 
that both desire is necessarily elusive. It remains likely that at least one of the funds 
currently being planned to take over from BSF will still fall short of that model, at least 
initially. 
 
At least in the Counties where BSF operates, there has been no clear improvement 
plan for CHDs either within or beyond BHS, to give stakeholders the ownership that 
they aspire to. Both NGOs and CHDs have commented on the difficulty of knowing 
how to engage with each other to improve these competencies, and few instances 
are reported of widespread planned improvements, such as the DHIS.  
3.2.2 Education 
Education partners spoke of the need for transparency between donors, NGOs and 
                                                
16 2011 MTR and questionnaires  
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MoEs around budget availability, targeting of resource, implementation and 
monitoring, and expressed a view that this had been achieved well through BSF. 
State MoE and County MoE executives all spoke positively of their sense of control 
over budget allocation, in terms of targeting school construction or teacher training 
resource to meet needs identified at County level. 
 
As State and County MoEs currently have only salary budgets17, they have no 
capacity to carry out fieldwork independently, and are dependant upon NGOs. Both 
NGOs and MoEs identified a need for a separate budget line, to provide direct 
funding to County MoEs, for example, to provide vehicles for field visits to 
construction or training centres, and to supplement community efforts to maintain 
school infrastructure. During BSF-IAe, some CEDs were provided with motorbikes, to 
enable education officers to visit schools within the district. 
 
Over the later years of BSF, there have been some improvements in involving 
County Education Officers in the training that takes place through BSF. 
3.2.3 WASH 
The engagement of communities in developing water supplies leading to “ownership” 
has been variable. In many cases, sites were selected without consultation with 
communities, decreasing the chances of building good provider/user relations and 
associated accountability mechanisms18.   
 
In terms of capacity building in WASH, BSF developed a good relationship at senior 
levels in MWRI and supported it to improve standards and technological approaches 
as part of capacity.  On field visits, BSF always started with meetings with the local 
authorities. Beyond that, it was constrained in taking a more strategic approach by 
the nature of the BSF’s remit, and in particular by the shortage of staff at local 
government. 
 
Development of better software procedures with minimum standards for community 
involvement was not addressed – this was left up to the individual NGOs. 
3.3 Lessons for the future 
BSF demonstrates 
BSF has demonstrated a sustained commitment to engagement with Government 
and other stakeholders at all levels, from the secretariat of the Steering Committee to 
the work of NGOs with local health and education committees. This has achieved 
important if limited improvements in ownership, planning, management and 
operations.  
Additional challenges 
 
• The importance of each stakeholder is not conditional on the current 
capacities of its office. Programmes need to accept the strengths and 
constraints of all stakeholders, including emergent local and national 
structures of government, and work with stakeholders to overcome these 
constraints.  
 
                                                
17 BSF-IA Review, 2011 
18 Cleaver 2011 
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• As Government structures emerge, funding mechanisms need to evolve 
explicit enabling steps to achieve the competences and structures required 
for a transfer of ownership, strategic and operational decision-making, and 
budgetary control from the funder and NGOs, to both national and local 
government bodies, elected representatives and other local stakeholders.  
 
• Support for stakeholder development must be supported by adequate 
resources, including staff and non-staff budgets, and technical support, in 
order for local government to participate effectively.  
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4 From Relief to Development 
4.1 Lessons Identified 
BSF began just 10 months after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 2005, 
in the immediate post-conflict recovery phase, when needs were very great, but 
government capacity to meet them was very weak. Peace and stability have not 
been complete, and nor can they be expected. Relief is still required to address the 
consequences of instability, conflict and population movements, in very challenging 
physical and economic circumstances. 
 
In such a context, there were specific challenges around the timing and balance 
between the urgent and on-going, needs for service delivery (relief), and the longer 
term goals of building sustainable structures and capacity within the emerging nation 
state (development), for example19: 
• Time Frames: relief requires rapid responses to short-term needs, where 
development depends on a strategic approach towards long-term goals. 
• Relationships with GoSS: relief agencies (INGOs and NNGOs) are often 
forced to operate more independently of government than development 
agencies which must work with government and build its capacity. 
• Delivering the Peace Dividend: CPA success was seen as depending upon 
tangible peace dividends, in the form of improved services which were 
unlikely to be achieved sufficiently rapidly through development approaches. 
 
BSF appeared to offer an opportunity to work along twin tracks20:  
• delivering a peace dividend as rapidly as possible along a relief-track,  
• paralleled by a slower development-track working to build capacities.  
 
BSF was initially devised as a short-term measure to deliver basic services "while 
long-term measures [such as MDTF] come on line"21.  Despite the short-term period 
of funding, the initial expected outcomes of BSF-1 were ambitious; perhaps overly 
so. As well as increased coverage and access to service delivery, BSF was expected 
to  
• provide strengthened systems and structures,  
• incorporate community-based, state and non-state provision;  
• improve policy, procedures, and standards for sector-based services through 
government agencies,  
• improve coordination and coherence in service delivery.22 
 
Yet in practice, given the short funding period, it was inevitable that actual capacity-
building measures would be limited and narrowly time-bound. The formal programme 
"outputs" in the logframe were very modest: the establishment of a Steering 
Committee; a body of successful projects in service delivery; and monitoring and 
evaluation "with a particular focus on lessons learning and dissemination within 
BSF"23.   
 
The management cost averaged 7.8% over the period24.  This management fee may 
have been insufficient to do much more than basic administration of the fund – the 
                                                
19 BSF-1 Review 2008 
20 BSF-1 Review 2008 
21 Inception Report BSF-IA Final,2010 
22 BSF-1 Project Memorandum 
23 See Annex 6: Evolution of Logical Framework of BSF Programmes 
24Error! Reference source not found. 
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implication is that the change in approach and associated capacity building should be 
incorporated in the NGO projects.  The short funding periods for grants, however, 
made it difficult for the NGOs to move out of ‘emergency mode’, and staff contracts 
had to be kept short resulting in high staff turnover. 25   This high turnover is 
characteristic of relief workers compared with development workers. 
 
The final report of BSF-126 found that MDTF funding was still delayed, creating a 
requirement for extension. The reviewers of BSF-1 questioned whether the BSF 
model could be copied and scaled-up to help GOSS expand access to basic services 
substantially? They believed it was possible, but it would depend on a more 
structured approach to commissioning work, and on finding service-providers willing 
to undertake larger programmes and to work to requirements defined by the 
programme, rather than by their own specialisms.27 
 
Throughout the BSF period, longer term aid instruments were expected to be just 
around the corner, and this was the essential justification for BSF-1, BSF-2, BSF-IA, 
and BSF-IAe, each as a bridging mechanism to something more long term that would 
address the move to development.  Development of state institutions has also been 
frustrated by many events affecting this fragile young state, such as the collapse of 
oil revenues in 2012. 
4.2 Extent to which these were addressed by BSF 
BSF-1 favoured an approach that sought to integrate relief to development into a 
single track: delivering a measurable improvement in basic services, as a 
contribution to the peace dividend, at the same time as disseminating lessons within 
government to direct and manage those services. Yet over its repeated iterations, 
BSF moved from these lofty but poorly defined objectives for capacity building, to 
more specifically defined but limited outputs (BSF-2 and BSF-IA), eventually coming 
to focus its formal programme design exclusively on outputs for service delivery, with 
no outputs for capacity development at all (BSF-IAe)28.  It did not take up the take up 
the challenge or ideas proposed by the BSF-1 review for more structured 
commissioned work.  
 
The reduction in declared ambition does not reflect unwillingness or effort to conduct 
capacity building. The latest phase, BSF-IAe funded one of the most concrete 
examples of capacity building, by supporting the implementation of the District Health 
Information System at CHDs). However, the reduction in planned capacity 
development outputs is a reflection of growing scepticism within BSF about what it 
could actually achieve at a programme level, given the limited potential for capacity 
building within short-term projects, and the limited funding for programme 
management. Nevertheless, a more ambitious programme might have argued to 
funders for funds to support a more pro-active approach to capacity development. 
 
Although conceived as a 20 month bridging project, the pace of the MDTF and other 
initiatives that were supposed to lead to a more developmental approach was slower 
than expected.  
 
                                                
25 BSF-2 Review 2009 
26 BSF QPR 4 2007 and QPR 1 2008 served as the final report for BSF-1. 
27 BSF-1 Review 2008 
28 See Annex 6: Evolution of Logical Framework of BSF Programmes 
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4.2.1 Health 
At the programme level, primary health services in 2012 face many of the same 
challenges for improving GoSS capacity as in 2006. Human resources, drug 
management and CHD capacity are recurrent issues in all BSF reviews and 
management reports. BSF and its partner NGOs have certainly been willing to 
engage in developing the systems and structures required at local and higher levels. 
Since 2011, and following the recommendation of the 2011 report, it has also made 
available more technical resources in health than hitherto.  
 
However, long-term training, capacity in drug management, and addressing the skill 
shortage have remained beyond BSF's control as a provider of funds for facilities and 
short-term operations. Likewise, although many NGOs have sought to support the 
work of CHDs and describe a positive working relationship, the functioning of CHDs 
remains variable and sometimes very low29 
 
BSF has sometimes been more able to support the transition to development at the 
project level. There was a strong increase in funding for training and capacity 
development between BSF-1, Round 1 and BSF-2, from 5% to 23%.30 From the 
NGO perspective, an NGO was able to claim that it had changed from an emergency 
relief operation to an "integrated primary health care and capacity building project". 
4.2.2 Education 
In relation to both school construction and teacher development, BSF has operated 
primarily in a 'relief' modality, in that services have been delivered primarily through 
NGOs, rather than through disbursement of funds through State and County MoEs. 
However, BSF education partners have shown significant evidence of working 
collaboratively, with shared ownership, particularly relating to decisions about 
resource allocation. It is likely that both the role of NGOs, and the pro-active 
involvement of State and County ministries, have been significant factors in BSFs' 
positive performance in service delivery. But not disbursing funds directly through 
state systems limits the extent of capacity and ownership longer term. 
 
For teacher development, some teacher training was delivered through County 
Education Centre (CEC) facilities.  Improvements from 2010 have been reported in 
the participation of County Education Officers (CEOs), with ELT teacher educators 
being appointed jointly between NGOs and State MoEs, and State MoE 'trainers of 
trainers' being used to train PTAs. However, there is no GOSS budget to sustain 
ongoing training activities through CECs. 
WASH 
Overall, a more in-depth study is required looking at levels of inclusion and 
accountability to communities being served by water schemes before conclusions 
can be drawn regarding links with wider state- and peace-building.  
 
Cleaver (2011) addresses the shortcomings of the predominately relief approach and 
the changes needed: 
“Given that the main mode of delivery of water in Southern Sudan to date has 
been one of humanitarian assistance, government structures are frequently 
bypassed and there is little attempt to involve the community on a sustainable 
                                                
29 Hutton, ‘Review of support provided by BSF grantees to County Health Departments’, BSF 
2012 
30 BSF Review 2009 
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basis. Switching to a developmental mode of service delivery will involve 
changing expectations of both providers and water users, and adopting 
different principles: community engagement; long-term sustainability, and water 
as a service rather than a hand-out.” 31  
4.3 Lessons for the Future 
BSF demonstrates: 
 
• BSF has shown that services can be delivered on the ground, often in very 
challenging circumstances. These have been delivered largely through a 
‘relief’ modality, using a mix of NNGOs or INGOs with large contingents of 
local staff, working in collaboration with embryonic local government at county 
and state level. Its approach has enabled BSF to implement more swiftly, 
effectively and cost-effectively than many programmes in South Sudan. 
 
• BSF has learned to work within its own limitations, recognising that more 
developmental approaches, emphasising capacity building, and delivery 
through, as well as with local government, require longer term programmes 
than are feasible with short-term limited funding.  
Additional Challenges 
 
• As well as ensuring effective delivery, funding mechanisms need to provide 
deeper support for Government capacity. Capacity development for transition 
requires more than adding training to inherently weak government systems. It 
also requires change in approach by NGO service providers, including 
development-oriented and experienced staff on longer term contracts.   
 
• Even short-term funds can make a start on this by allocating a percentage of 
funds for short developmental steps, commissioning these from specialist 
organisations alongside service delivery projects. 
 
• Funding partners need to acknowledge Government aspirations for control 
over funds, such as utilising Government payrolls and systems. Governments 
and their partners therefore need to work together to fulfil at least some of 
these aspirations over the life of a fund, whilst managing the inherent risks to 
service delivery and VfM.  
 
• Funds must be able to respond to unforeseen interruptions and reversals in 
capacity development, and not allow these to frustrate the commitment to 
service delivery or capacity development. 
 
• Long-term and predictable funding is a pre-condition for working towards 
Government aspirations, and for transforming fragmented and supply-driven 
services into a strategic response to need. 
  
                                                
31 Cleaver 2011 
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5 Conflict 
5.1 Lessons identified 
Conflict sensitivity was necessarily one of BSF’s core principles: “Employ a conflict-
sensitive approach to service delivery projects and programmes; at a minimum, ‘do 
no harm’ by not exacerbating existing tensions; ideally basic service provision will 
build on conflict analysis to reinforce security and stability”32.  
 
The overall conclusion of the Multi-donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention 
and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 2005-201033  , which included BSF, 
was that:  
“Support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding [CPPB] has only been partially 
successful. Donor policies and strategies did not fully take into account key drivers 
of violence resulting in an overemphasis of basic services and a relative neglect of 
security, policing and the rule of law, which are essential in state formation. 
Ongoing insecurity compromised effectiveness and sustainability of basic services 
and livelihood development. Supporting state building in Southern Sudan requires 
an inclusive approach.”  
 
More specifically, the Evaluation makes two important points: 
“Donors have re-configured the term [marginalised] to emphasise ‘lack of 
development and services’, and by doing so have implied that this is a major 
cause of conflict. Local conflict may arise from disputes over access to resources, 
but these can escalate either because of historical factors or because of political 
manipulation. Lack of development might, at most, be a cause of disaffection that 
contributes to tension in such cases but it cannot be cited as either a sole or 
significant cause of conflict. 
 
“A dominant ‘theory of change’ resulting from this conceptual assumption is that 
‘all development contributes to CPPB’, encapsulated in the term ‘peace dividend’. 
The logic seems to be that development is not only a reward for peace (the CPA) 
but that failure to deliver a ‘peace dividend’ could lead to conflict. The evidence for 
such a claim is derived from studies on CPPB conducted in other parts of the 
world, but the causal link between delivering services and abating violence is not 
found in Southern Sudan, despite this being the dominant paradigm that informs 
the aid operations. In Southern Sudan a more precise identification of the causes 
of conflict is needed.” 
5.1.1 Health 
No evidence was found of conflict arising from BSF interventions. 
 
As well as BSF’s increasing focus on displaced people at the programme level, 
NGOs show awareness of conflict in project design and execution. NGOs 
emphasised the importance of listening to a range of tribal, community and political 
interests in the consultation process, and care in balancing recruitment between 
tribes.  
 
Threatened or actual conflicts at several levels have disrupted construction, service 
delivery, resulted and resulted in loss of materials and facilities: inter-clan disputes, 
militia and cross-border activities have all been cited as causes. Strengthening health 
                                                
32 BSF Application Guidelines, third round 2008 
33 J.Bennet et al. Policy Brief, 2010 
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services has also been reported as a driver for reconciliation efforts. 
 
The BPHS has been criticized for the absence of services addressing sexual and 
gender-based violence36 possibly because they are less cost effective than other 
interventions. There is evidence that violence against women is exacerbated in war-
torn areas; and because of their status in society women’s health is influenced by 
gender-based violence37. This is closely linked to consideration of the need and 
potential for basic services to address mental health needs following conflict and 
emergencies38. These are areas where, in other settings, NGOs have been effective 
in both analysis and response39. 
5.1.2 Education  
No evidence was found of conflict arising from BSF interventions in education. 
 
There was an increasing focus on displaced peoples at the programme level, and 
NGOs worked closely with State and County level MoE personnel, in dialogue with 
local communities, to prioritise the very limited resources for school construction to 
the communities where the need was perceived to be greatest. Within this process of 
dialogue and planning, MoE and NGOs took account of returnee populations.  
5.1.3 WASH  
As well as taking account of locations where dislocated populations will settle, 
decisions about the location of water infrastructure may also partly determine 
patterns of resettlement. Whilst donors may see increased provision of basic 
services as a peace dividend40, there little evidence that increased service provision 
correlates with reduced tribal conflict41. In addition, studies in other countries have 
shown that provision of water supplies for pastoralists can lead to concentrations of 
people and animals, resulting in overuse of the water resource and environmental 
degradation from over-grazing, both of which can be a cause of conflict.42 
 
The BSF-IA Review found that the actual numbers of users of boreholes in several 
places may be much higher than assumed, “sometimes more than 1,000.  … It was 
reported that such high usage generates arguments and conflict.”43  
 
5.2 Extent to which these were addressed by BSF 
NGOs and BSF have responded well to changing needs. BSF showed flexibility in 
increasing funding to NGOs responding to increased demand from returnees and 
IDP.  
                                                
36 Roberts, Guy, Sondorp and Lee-Jones 2008 
37 (Pavlish and Ho, 2009a and 2009b) 
38 Mental Health and Conflicts: Conceptual Framework and Approaches, F Baingana, I 
Bannon and R Thomas, World Bank, 2005 
39 Mental and social health during and after acute emergencies: emerging consensus?, van 
Omeron et al 2005, Poverty and mental disorders: breaking the cycle in low-income and 
middle-income countries, C Lund et al, The Lancet 2011 
40 (Bennett et al., 2010) quoted by Cleaver 2011 
41 (Cleaver, 2011) 
42 Reference to be identified 
43 BSF-IA Review 2011 
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5.2.1 Health 
Both in guidelines and in practice, BSF and NGOs have sought to respond to the 
needs of internally displaced people and host populations in these areas. BSF-IA 
specifically focused health interventions in these areas. BSF has responded well to 
opportunities identified by NGOs to respond to health and other needs (e.g. a 
borehole) of IDPs. Conflicts, and the need to respond to them, are on-going and 
ever-changing. Well-positioned NGOs in long-term service provision have been able 
to provide important intelligence for humanitarian NGOs arriving to address 
emergencies.  
 
While this sensitivity is important, there has been less consideration of the design 
and response of health services to address social or individual needs arising from 
conflict. The Peer Reviews do not consider conflict in relation to ownership, or the 
delivery of services. 
5.2.2 Education 
In BSF-IA and BSF-IAe, “…interventions of school construction and additional 
English language training have specifically targeted this policy [of integration] by 
providing host-communities with permanent schools…. and providing returnee 
teachers with the language skills they require to fit into South Sudan’s Anglophone 
education system”44. 
 
Teacher training in English predominantly targeted Arabic-speaking teachers 
returning from Sudan, having reached some 428 teachers in BSF-IAe, through NGO 
delivered ELT training. By comparison, the scale of school construction for returnee 
populations, and host communities, was limited. BSF-IA-e aimed to construct only 48 
classrooms… equivalent to six schools of the GoSS pattern.  
 
The scale of school construction was extremely modest in relation to need: “…In 7/10 
states, there are over five hundred school-aged children per classroom…In order to 
meet 50:1 ratios, South Sudan will need 24,000 new classrooms …. Challenges are 
likely to be exacerbated in areas with increasing numbers of returnees”45 The actual 
BSF response could therefore only be seen as a very partial response to the 
enormous needs of IDPs and their host communities. That the relatively sparse 
investment in educational infrastructure, in a context of such great need, does not 
appear to have caused conflict, is a testament to the participatory and inclusive 
processes developed by BSF, NGOs and State and County MoEs, in planning and 
delivering outputs.  
5.2.3 WASH 
The location of waterpoints was left to NGOs to determine. In some cases they 
ensured provision of waterpoints for returnees, and some provided water for cattle to 
prevent conflict between settled people and pastoralists. 
5.3 Lessons for the Future 
BSF demonstrates: 
 
• Close support to carefully selected NGOs with strong local experience has 
enabled BSF to deliver good practice at the project level in primary health and 
                                                
44 BSF-IAe QPR 3 
45 BSF-IAe Business Case 2011 
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education, where sensitively designed projects have responded to the needs 
of IDPs and host populations without causing or exacerbating conflict. This 
has been achieved despite the very modest resources available.  
Additional Challenges 
 
• Fund programmesFunds should be informed by a deep analysis of the 
specific drivers of conflict in the particular context rather than assuming 
generalisations from elsewhere. They need to work with Government and 
service providers to realise the strategic potential of basic services in 
preventing and responding to conflict and other emergencies. Programme 
design needs to include indicators of progress in conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding46  
 
• The design of services should respond to problems arising from conflict. 
Basic services are likely to need to be adapted to address such issues as 
gender-based violence, needs of former child soldiers, mental health and 
interrupted education.  
  
                                                
46  Policy Brief from Aiding the Peace: A Multi-donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict 
Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 2005-2010  
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6 Gender 
6.1 Introduction 
Gender is an important dimension of inequality and exclusion from basic services in 
health, education and WASH. Other dimensions of inequality result from conflict, 
disability, including disability from armed conflict, displacement, nomadism, rural and 
urban disparities47, and cannot be addressed fully in this report.  
 
When CIDA conducted a gender equality assessment of BSF, it concluded: “Despite 
the lack of gender expertise and effective tracking mechanisms, there are indications 
of attention given to gender equality results with positive gender mainstreaming 
outcomes.”48 This finding was echoed in the BSF Review of 2009.  
 
An understanding of gender-specific needs must lie at the root of any gender 
strategy, so that actions take account of specific gender issues, whether relating to 
health, education, WASH, or underlying social and cultural factors, including 
nomadism and conflict. The Gender Equity Assessment of 2009 noted the lack of a 
gender baseline, and recommended that this be undertaken. 
6.2 Lessons identified 
6.2.1 Health 
Health programmes were not designed from a strongly gender-specific perspective. 
Nor were gender-specific indicators widely reported by BSF initially. However, both 
BSF and NGOs stress that women are principal beneficiaries of primary health 
programmes, with activities strongly focused on maternal and child health. Some 
NGOs reported that men felt that they had less to gain from primary health 
programmes. The health benefit to women has been hard to demonstrate: reductions 
in maternal mortality cannot be demonstrated over a short period, neither without a 
clear methodology and baseline49. 
 
Women were also reported to be actively involved in hygiene groups, community 
groups, though the 2010 Peer Review found that only 20% of Health Committee 
members were female. 
 
BSF recorded training by gender, but it is unclear whether BSF was able to help 
women advance in nursing, midwifery, management or other health careers. Most 
courses were very short, less than 4 days for a community health worker. The focus 
of many NGOs on training traditional birth attendants and community midwives was 
at odds with GoSS policy, which – realistically or not – demanded higher level 
professionals, of whom BSF was able to train very few. 
6.2.2 Education 
Improving girls’ participation in education. 
BSF promoted a number of ‘girl friendly’ approaches intended to change attitudes 
within schools and communities, to girls’ participation in education. These included 
gender dimensions to PTA training, provision of ‘comfort kits’, uniform, feeding 
programmes and counselling for girls. 
                                                
47 Fitzgerald, 2002; Breidlid, 2005???? 
48 Salih M K, 2008 
49 Case Study – Millennium Development Goals Southern Sudan, BSF 2009 
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The proportion of female teacher participants in BSF INSET and PRESET training is 
low (for example, a 15:85 gender ratio was reported for teachers participating in ELT 
INSET in NBEG50). To some extent, this may reflect the low representation of 
females within the teaching population, which in turn reflects the low representation 
of females within the education system more generally. Additionally, state education 
directors identified provision of childcare as a major obstacle to female teachers’ 
participation in teacher development programmes. There is also some suggestion 
that the long time period (four years) required to complete the GoSS INSET 
curriculum may be problematic for women51. 
6.2.3 WASH  
It has been noted that in contexts where many men migrate with cattle, the 
importance of creating space for women’s voices to influence planning. Management 
of water resources goes beyond issues of representation and participation alone, to 
being critical in achieving sustainable impact through water governance.52  
 
There is insufficient evidence of community consultation in planning, or participation 
in implementation, of water resource management through BSF, and the extent of 
pro-active approaches to enable women’s voices to be heard is less clear. Some 
NGOs ensure up to 50% representation by women on committees and participation 
in hygiene behaviour change, but the effectiveness of this is not clear. 
6.3 Extent to which these were addressed by BSF 
Cleaver argues that “fraught gender relationships seem to be a major social fault-line 
in the post-conflict situation in Southern Sudan, and yet service provision on the 
whole is apparently planned with gender as something of an ‘add-on’”53  
 
The 2009 BSF Review noted the lack of any explicit mandate to address gender in 
the Call for Proposals of 2009. This was seen as a “missed opportunity”.54  
 
At each stage, however, there have been limits to the action available for BSF. It 
would have been hard to justify the cost of a gender “baseline” gender study for BSF, 
as recommended in the 2008 Gender Equity study, when BSF was due to close in 
mid 2010.  
 
When considering how BSF evolved to address gender issues, we also need to 
consider what was feasible within the constraints of a temporary programme. 
6.3.1 Health 
BSF continued to rely primarily on the assumed public health benefit to women of 
health improvement. However, it quantified these, setting explicit targets for women 
attending Ante-Natal Care, and for attended births. The latter is proving most difficult 
to achieve.  
 
Possibly, if BSF had focused on attended births or other gender-specific indicators in 
2006 rather than 2012, it might have advanced further. However, recording 
                                                
50 interview 6th October 2012 
51 BSF-IAe Q3 Report 
52 Cleaver 2011, from analysis based on various authors  
53 Cleaver F, 2011 
54 BSF Review 2009 
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performance does not necessarily improve it. Women’s confidence in delivering at a 
facility or with a skilled attendant is linked to service access, quality and 
communication, which in turn depend on the availability of skilled staff, facilities, 
medicines and effective referral systems.  
 
In practice it is hard for NGOs on short-term contracts to address these long-term 
factors, particularly the availability of skilled midwifery staff. Short term interventions, 
such as the proposal of the BSF Gender Equality Assessment that BSF should work 
more with TBAs, would have gone against GoSS policy. However, GoSS had not 
turned its policy into a workable HR Plan, so it was impossible for BSF to win: short 
term solutions such as training of community health workers, community midwives, 
TBAs and other health cadres were criticised as being against GoSS policy, but in 
order for BSF or NGOs to train staff successfully, GoSS would have need to provide 
a national training plan for them to slot into.  
 
BSF has not focused on improving women’s participation in project management and 
communication with a clear programme of activities and outputs. Although there is 
evidence of good practice in committees, hygiene groups and community facilitation, 
the evidence remains anecdotal, rather than systemic. 
6.3.2 Education 
Construction 
 
BSF School construction and improvement programmes considered gender 
requirements regarding dormitories, staff accommodation, and segregated washing 
areas. Earlier evaluations recommended increasing the number of latrines to two per 
classroom (one male and one female), so that appropriate numbers of latrines were 
available for use during short breaks 55 . However, the extent to which such 
considerations could be implemented was somewhat limited by the standard GoSS 
school construction specification. 
Teacher Training 
 
Female only Per Diems were used to encourage participation of women teachers in 
some ELT INSET programmes, but were not widely adopted due to the tensions this 
created between male and female participants. 
 
State Education Directors in NBEG suggested a number of further approaches to 
enable female participation in future teacher training, including provision of additional 
per diems to enable female teachers to bring child minders with them for residential 
training; keeping training within the County, to reduce travel times and concerns over 
unaccompanied women travelling or being away for extended periods; increasing the 
presence of female tutors at training courses, and considering the possibility of 
female only training courses. 
 
6.3.3 WASH 
It appears that issues of gender in WASH were largely left to the NGOs to address, 
many of which have policies on gender in WASH. 
                                                
55 BSF-IA Review, 2011 
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6.4 Lessons for the future 
BSF demonstrates: 
 
• BSF has delivered a ‘general good’ in health, education, and WASH, which 
broadly benefits women and girls. In doing this, BSF has also demonstrated 
gender sensitive practices in programme delivery, such as the formation of 
Hygiene Groups in Health, provision of Comfort Kits in education, and in 
training of female artisans in community based WASH programmes and 
equal numbers of men and women for WUCs.  
 
Additional challenges 
 
• Funds need in-depth gender analysis, with subsequent input to policy and 
practice for service design and delivery.  
 
• In order to progress on gender and other inequalities, a future fund needs a 
baseline of women and girls’ needs and resources, their access to services, 
employment and engagement in decision-making 
 
• Programme design should address issues of women’s ownership of service 
design and delivery, with programmes that provide incentives and reduce 
barriers to women’s participation.  
 
• Programmes should use gender-specific measures of outcome, service 
delivery, employment and engagement. 
  
 Learning from BSF  DRAFT  28 December 2012  24 
7 Performance  
7.1 Lessons identified 
BSF has focused on coverage of and access to water and sanitation, education and 
primary health services. Water and sanitation was not addressed in BSF-IAe (except 
for infrastructure in schools and primary health facilities), (due to the financial 
restrictions, low priority and lack of a WASH advisor in the lead donor, DFID, and 
increasing WASH activity from European donors) which only addressed primary 
health and education. 
 
When BSF was established, donors typically focussed upon ‘outputs’ when 
monitoring project performance. Over the life of the BSF mechanism, there has been 
a global shift in emphasis from monitoring ‘outputs’ to ‘outcomes’. BSF has 
attempted to respond to such changes. (See Annex 6: Evolution of Logical 
Framework of BSF Programmes(See Annex 6: Evolution of Logical Framework of 
BSF Programmes). 
 
There is a widespread perception by reviewers, observers and stakeholders of strong 
performance in service delivery. NGOs attributed this to 
• close monitoring, with responsive support by BSF staff 
• monthly reporting by NGOs: although this was found to be burdensome, 
punctual monthly reports (performance and expenditure) received equally 
punctual funding. 
• Flexibility and re-allocation of unspent funds to meet changes in needs and 
opportunities 
 
7.1.1 Health 
Initially BSF reported only outpatient consultations and the number of facilities built, 
rehabilitated or supported. The services provided were not specified so there was 
hard to assess what services were delivered, their quality or their contribution to 
health. However, even this limited information was far beyond what was available 
from any other primary health facilities. 
 
BSF sought to understand the quality as well as quantity of services, with effective 
use of Peer Reviews in 2008 and 2010. These identified major issues in  
• Quality and access to facilities  
• Level of service utilization 
• Scope of service delivery, with NGOs typically delivering only 50-60% of the 
BPHS  
• Lack of trained staff, particularly in midwifery  
• Dependence on NGOs, especially for staff incentives and drug supplies 
• Weakness of CHDs and lack of plans for CHDs to take over facilities 
 
Unfortunately there is no recent comparative information about non-donor supported 
facilities. It is likely that many facilities without donor support were performing much 
worse than those reviewed.  
7.1.2 Education  
Monitoring of education so far has been essentially quantitative, at an output level 
(e.g. How many schools built, how many teachers trained). There is a need to 
develop more qualitative monitoring and evaluation criteria for education 
programmes, particularly in relation to teacher development. 
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7.1.3 WASH  
Throughout the BSF, numbers of beneficiaries for water supply were estimated for 
both planning and reporting, initially at 500 per water point based on the SPHERE56 
indicators for emergency response, and subsequently at 250 per water point in 
accordance with MWRI’s Technical Guidelines. Actual number of people with access 
to the waterpoints was not assessed. The numbers of beneficiaries for household 
latrines was estimated at 5, which is reasonable as it is based on family size; actual 
usage has not been assessed or reported.57 
 
Regarding household latrines, both planned and achieved targets were only a small 
fraction of the actual numbers of users for water supply – about 15% in BSF-IA.  This 
was despite GoSS’s requirement, and the generally accepted principle 
internationally, that programmes of supply and sanitation should achieve equal 
coverage.  
 
Weaknesses in quality were found in borehole construction due to: lack of control of 
construction contracts; water quality, in particular due to chemical parameters; and 
the processes for development and implementation of water supply projects and 
hygiene promotion.58 
7.2 Extent to which these were addressed by BSF 
7.2.1 Health 
BSF has built on its early success in delivery, from 743,000 consultations a year 
under BSF 159, to an estimated 1,440,000 60 primary health consultations in 2012 
based on NGO targets. BSF has facilitated, rather than driven delivery, through clear 
and punctual funding mechanisms, positive monitoring and support. 
 
BSF has been unable to address fundamental limitations of its design that limit its 
capacity to focus on health improvement rather than service delivery:  
• Service design is facility-based, not population-based, partly because of 
constraints within the County Health structure 
• The consultation rather than the impact of the intervention is the focus, partly 
as a result non-standard health provider erporting 
• The focus is short-term service delivery, rather than long-term health 
improvement, as a result of BSF’s own short term design. 
 
Measuring health outcomes remains problematic. A programme over 5-10 years is 
more likely to demonstrate changes in child or maternal mortality, making it more 
suitable for state or federal surveys in line with GoSS’s Health Sector Development 
Plan. 
 
CHDs still suffer a severe lack of qualified staff, resources or guidance61 . BSF 
grantees have provided a variable range of training and support inputs, in which the 
most consistent component was support for implementation of the district health 
                                                
56 The SPHERE Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian 
Response, http://www.sphereproject.org/handbook/ 
57 Reviews of BSF-1, BSF-2 and BSF-IA 
58 Reviews of BSF-1, BSF-2 and BSF-IA, BMB Mott MacDonald (2009).  
59 742,000 consultations over 21 months, BSF-IAe QPR3 
60 BSF-IAe Inception Report 
61 Review of support provided by BSF grantees to County Health Departments, June 2012 ,  
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information system, but there has been a lack strategic objectives to drive a 
significant contribution to address local skill shortages. 
7.2.2 Education 
Construction 
 
Overcrowding within newly constructed schools, in years immediately following 
construction, was likely to significantly impact quality of teaching and learning, and 
mitigate against teachers’ being able to implement pedagogical practices developed 
through INSET or PRESET effectively. However, this was not monitored 
systematically. 
Teacher Training 
 
Lack of English language competence was thought to have limited teachers’ ability to 
benefit from the INSET programme, which used English as the Medium of 
Instruction. 
 
BSF tried to organise teacher development such that teachers first completed ELT 
training, before going on to complete training in the INSET curriculum. The extent to 
which this happened in practice is unclear. There remains no obvious large-scale, 
low-cost method for assessing communicative English Language Competence, 
which might have been used to assess teachers’ learning gains from the English 
Language training, or their readiness to participate in INSET or PRESET 
programmes delivered through English medium. 
 
There were moves with schools to look at attendance instead of enrolment, but in 
terms of teacher training, there were no standard assessment instruments (in terms 
of curriculum knowledge), or monitoring / evaluation instruments (in terms of 
classroom practices). Therefore, training outcomes tended to be measured in terms 
of completion. 
7.2.3 WASH 
The timing of BSF Phases was determined by the donors, so BSF was not able to 
adjust timing to fit with the seasonal dependence for construction activities.  BSF 
addressed this problem by allowing flexibility so that construction was carried out 
very late in the funding phase, but during appropriate seasons for construction. 
This illustrates a very positive aspect of BSF – rather than just funding NGOs, the 
donors allowed BSF the scope to intervene and provide additional support to improve 
the activities and outcomes of the NGOs.	  
 
BSF addressed issues of quality by developing construction standards in 
collaboration with MWRI and organising seminars and training.	  
7.3 Lessons for the Future 
BSF demonstrates: 
 
Despite insecurity and many other obstacles, BSF has achieved a productive and 
responsive grant-making process, delivering substantial volumes of service output. 
Important features of its practice include 
• Efficient management of competitive award contracts,  
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• Flexibility and responsiveness in redirecting funds to, projects and 
opportunities where progress is possible, when environmental, security or 
capacity issues block progress elsewhere  
• Good understanding of NGO projects and concerns, based on frequent, well-
reported monitoring 
• Providing specialist resources where needed, e.g. construction, reproductive 
health 
• Prompt disbursements to NGOs and reporting to donors 
• High expectations of delivery and reporting by service providers, and support 
to enable them to achieve it 
 
BSF has harnessed available NGO capacity to deliver outputs where and when this 
has been possible. Although this model can be criticised, as in the 2008 review, as 
‘NGO proposes, funder disposes’, it nevertheless has merits as a realistic approach 
to maximising outputs, in the transition from relief to development.  
Additional Challenges 
 
• Funds need a clear theory of change, that show how performance in 
delivering outputs (facilities built, training completed) translates into positive 
outcomes in health, education and WASH, and clear indicators for monitoring 
outcomes. 
 
• The assessment of performance needs to embrace the institutions and their 
capacity to support development, as full as service delivery.  
 
• Although need is initially hard to quantify, programmes strategies for service 
delivery need to be realistic responses to the scale of local and national 
demand, so that service delivery is not degraded by overuse, for instance by 
overuse of boreholes, or made irrelevant by the inadequacy of its scale, for 
instance in high cost training projects for small numbers of teachers. 
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8 Value for money 
8.1 Introduction 
Value for Money is the result of the economy in the use of resources, using them 
efficiently, and ensuring that they are effective in delivering project outputs and 
outcomes.  
 
BSF has consistently emphasised financial accountability: providing payment in 
arrears, working hard to achieve an efficient and accountable use of resources. 
NGOs praise the promptness of BSF’s payments, and have generally reported 
regularly and reliably.  
 
MM provided BSF with technical and management expertise at moderate cost. The 
management cost shown by BSF at the outset was 9.6% of total cost, reducing 
slightly, to provide an average of 7.8% over the period .62 BSF is a small, hard-
working and dedicated team. However, BSF has remained a parallel system to 
government administration over 7 years. 
8.2 Lessons identified 
8.2.1 Health 
The 2008 review challenged the affordability of primary health services, arguing that 
the annual cost of $14 per head was double the 200563 estimate. The 2011 Review 
found that the BSF component of costs was only $6 per head, though this excluded 
Government expenditure. BSF expenditure rose to $11 64  during South Sudan’s 
economic crisis following the loss of oil revenues in 2012, when the Austerity budget 
affected government payrolls and drug supplies, and fuel costs tripled. Recurrent 
costs therefore remain vulnerable to economic instability. 
 
Construction costs in health were lower in BSF-IA than in the previous phase (e.g. 
weighted average PHCU cost down from £36,975 to £30,53065. and significantly 
below costs indicated in the 2005 Joint Assessment Mission.66 However, the value for 
money of these units depends on their specification and longevity. Facilities continue 
to vary in specification, and building lifetime and maintenance costs remain unclear.  
 
It is hard to form a useful assessment of the efficiency of primary health 
programmes: 
• NGO reports have been in diverse formats, and based on facilities rather than 
populations;  
• district health information systems are still being established;  
• diversity of geographical conditions, instability, pastoralism, population 
density and mobility make comparisons between facilities difficult 
 
The focus of BSF’s health programme was largely determined by NGOs’ own 
programmes and therefore not necessarily focused on the most cost effective 
interventions. Many highly cost effective interventions are available in reproductive 
                                                
62 See Annex 8: BSF Management Cost 
63 Joint Assessment Mission Sudan 2005, World Bank and United Nations 
64 BSF communications 2012 
65 BSF-2 Completion Report; BSF-IA Completion Report. The weighted average cost takes 
account of variations in cost of access, building materials and techniques between areas. 
66 data from United Nations Office for Project Services, UNOPS, in BSF-IA MTR 2011 
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health, child health, malaria, immunisation, control of malaria67 and neglected tropical 
diseases 68 . Highly cost effective public health interventions are also available, 
particularly in water and sanitation.  
 
Here the focus of each major donor-funded programme, largely operating in different 
states and counties is different. It can be argued that all these approaches are 
consistent with emerging Government policy. However, BSF’s documentation did not 
provide a strong rationale, economic or otherwise, for the  of one approach rather 
than another. 
• BSF: broad range of primary care, including construction and rehabilitation 
• USAID: seven high impact health interventions.69 
• MDTF: government capacity for monitoring and evaluation and other “back-
end” functions70. 
8.2.2 Education 
School Construction 
 
National NGOs were found to offer significantly better VfM for school construction 
than International NGOs, lowering costs, whilst enabling construction in some of the 
more challenging geographical and security environments. BSF construction costs 
were reportedly amongst the lowest for any construction project (government or 
donor) in South Sudan.71 
Teacher Training 
 
There were significant challenges around teacher retention within the school system, 
which may have some impact upon VfM from teacher training. Low retention was 
thought to be linked to uncertainties around level and regularity of remuneration for 
teachers. During the oil pipeline closure, austerity rates were less than 1/4 of the 
normal (already low) salary. Teachers sometimes went unpaid for several months. 
Qualified teachers, post-austerity budget, may have been paid as little as 200 South 
Sudanese Pounds (~£38) per month72 Teachers finishing their PRESET courses also 
went onto a lower pay grade than they may have anticipated, as the final 4th module 
of the GoSS teacher education curriculum was not finalised.  
 
There were also concerns over the efficiency of some of the INSET delivery, in 
which:- 
• some teacher educators were paid for a full day, but only had a few hours 
contact per day with teachers, 
• some teachers regularly spent a significantly greater proportion of time 
travelling to and from training, than participating in it. 
                                                
67 See World Health Organisation, WHO-CHOICE: Choosing cost effective interventions in 
health www.who.int/choice/  
68 The Global Programme to Eliminate Lymphatic Filariasis: Health Impact after 8 Years, E A 
Ottesen and others, PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases, 2008 
69  South Sudan Health Transformation Project Phase II, End of Project Performance 
Evaluation, USAID 
70 Delivering Results 2011 Annual Report, Multi Donor Trust Fund 
71 BSF-IAe QPR 3 
72 BSF-IAe QPR 3 
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8.2.3 WASH 
Although the BSF costs were in line with other programmes, early reviews 
considered future affordability for GoSS a major cause for concern.  There was wide 
variation between NGOs in the costs of drilling boreholes, some due to geographical 
and geophysical differences, but mainly due to different contract arrangements (bill of 
quantities or lump sum).73  Costs increased significantly in BSF-2, again with wide 
variation mainly due to the different type of contract74.  Taken together with BSF 
more recent review75, the evidence on variation in costs due to contract type is 
inconclusive.  
 
The predominant technology for water supply has been new boreholes fitted with 
handpumps, with little consideration for alternatives such as hand-dug wells and 
traditional sources.  The alternatives have the advantage of being cheaper and 
easier to maintain, with more of the construction cost contributing to the local 
economy, albeit at some risk to the reliability of the water quality. It is, however, 
difficult to assess the value for money of individual components for water supply due 
to wide variation in geographical and hydrogeological conditions.76  
 
It is not clear in BSF reports whether recent rehabilitations are restoring boreholes 
that were newly constructed in earlier phases of BSF.  If this is the case, it 
substantially lowers the value for money. This relates to one of the most critical parts 
of value for money: sustainability. Software processes for development of water 
supplies and hygiene behaviour-change are a foundation for sustainability. Without 
adequate funding, the value of the infrastructure will be lost.  
 
On institutional sanitation, where the whole cost of the latrines is provided through 
the BSF funding, the average cost has remained the same, with increases and 
decreases depending on the soil type.  Only one NGO reported on the costs of 
household toilets.  
8.3 The extent to which these issues were addressed by BSF?  
8.3.1 General 
BSF has maintained and improved its disbursement of funds, keeping closer to plans 
for construction and delivery of service than many funds, both in South Sudan and 
elsewhere. Despite maintaining a modest management cost, it also provided 
additional technical support for construction under BSF-IA, and for health in BSF-IAe.  
 
However, the scope for major improvements in repeated programmes of 12-20 
months is much smaller than for a 5 year programme. There is a tendency to repeat 
previous ways of working, rather than innovate. Thus, in 2012, 12% of BSF contracts 
were led by NNGOs, which were found to have lower costs in classroom 
construction. This is barely higher than the average for the whole programme of 
9%77. There is no process for developing NNGOs so that they might be equipped to 
bid as a lead contractor in a year’s time.  
                                                
73 BSF Review 2008 
74 BSF Review 2009 
75 BMB Mott MacDonald (2012) 
76 BSF Review 2011 
77 BSF-IAe QPR 3 
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8.3.2 Health 
In response to the need to demonstrate effectiveness, BSF now monitors many more 
aspects of health service delivery. This does not tell us, however, whether 
effectiveness has improved, or provided a means for improving it.  
 
BSF has been unable to make strong advances in reducing the cost of consultation, 
whether by economy or efficiency. Many of the reasons for this have been beyond 
BSF’s control: efforts to rationalise and integrate GRSS and NGO human resource 
costs have not yet produced savings; the underlying shortage of skilled staff 
increases reliance on non-local staff, and necessitates intensive supervision to 
achieve quality; drug supply remains very dependent of NGO supplies; and the 
weakness of County Health Departments further increases NGO costs. 
 
Within the context of a short-term programme, BSF has done what it can, but small 
numbers of short courses in county administration or community health are quite 
inadequate for the challenges of building competent CHDs and trained clinical staff.  
8.3.3 Education 
BSF Monitoring included financial management indicators, time efficiency indicators, 
and assessments of how closely NGOs have worked with County and State MoEs. In 
education, NNGOs, and INGOs with high proportions of national staff, performed 
relatively well on these indicators. In particular, the best performing NGOs (spending 
against forecasting) all had South Sudanese Project managers.78  
School Construction 
 
The investment by BSF in building NNGO capacity for project management 
administration and systems, together with rapid disbursement mechanisms, enabled 
some NNGOs to participate in BSF, without dependence upon INGOs as 
intermediaries. As capacity within NNGOs was built, school construction times were 
been greatly decreased in BSF-IA and BSF-IAe, compared to BSF 1 & 2, whilst 
construction costs were minimised. 
Teacher Training 
 
BSF was not able to improve the productivity of tutors, or find a more effective and 
efficient model of operation, although they did explore the possibility of tutors using 
the school hours of each day, to visit student-teachers in their schools. 
 
Issues of teacher retention (including payroll reform and the completion of the GoSS 
teacher education curriculum) were beyond the scope of BSF.  
8.3.4 WASH 
BSF has supported MWRI in major efforts to reduce the cost of drilling new 
boreholes, by working on improving technical standards for borehole construction, 
including geophysical survey to reduce the rate of dry boreholes, and by the use of 
Bill of Quantity type contracts for the for drilling of boreholes.  These efforts were 
coordinated with government partners and other agencies, and included seminars 
and guidelines. 
 
                                                
78 BSF-IAe QPR 3 
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There has not been any significant effort to address the cost of household latrines, or 
to incorporate current international trends on the financing of sanitation to more 
effectively target the use of subsidies.79 
8.4 Lessons for the future 
BSF Demonstrates: 
 
• BSF shows that good funding programmes can provide Value for Money, 
within the constraints of a short-term funding model operating in difficult 
economic, political and geographical conditions. BSF has used an efficient 
management agent with reducing overheads, committed to cost effectiveness 
and the quality of its own service to NGOs.  
 
Additional Challenges 
 
• In order to assess their value, programmes should provide a clear economic 
appraisal of the expected social, economic and institutional benefits of their 
outcomes, and monitor progress against these. 
  
Funding programmes need to make longer term investments to break out of the high 
costs incurred by short-term programmes. They need to work with their partners in 
government and service delivery to address major cost drivers through, e.g.  
• Human resource interventions that go beyond small scale short-term training 
to address the skill shortages that inflate the costs of basic services 
• Reform of supply chains to provide reliable and affordable equipment, 
materials and medical supplies 
• Investment in new technologies for delivery, maximizing the use of 
sustainable local resources and “software”, rather than the standard solutions 
used by relief programmes  
• Reducing duplication of management systems by integrating the fund within 
national and local government structures,  
• Increasing direct contracting by local NGOs and other local suppliers. 
  
                                                
79 See, for example, Evans, B., C. v. d. Voorden, et al. (2009). Public Funding for Sanitation: 
the many faces of sanitation subsidies. Geneva, Water Supply & Sanitation Collaborative 
Council  
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9 Sustainability 
9.1 Lessons Identified 
At the field or community level, BSF has made significant investments to engender 
and support community ownership of outputs, particularly in relation to built 
infrastructure, such as health facilities, schools and water-points. At this level, 
sustainability may be considered in relation to communities’ ability to maintain the 
benefit of these structures, once external funding and NGO support is withdrawn.  
 
Sustainability may also be considered in terms of the ongoing expansion of basic 
services provision, post-BSF, and of the ability to retain the insights into effective 
ways of working that have been developed through BSF’s 7 years of practice. The 
BSF 2008 review noted that GoSS did not have independent budgets to maintain the 
infrastructure that BSF had constructed, nor to continue the expansion of this 
infrastructure:  “while immediate delivery has been good, sustainability and broader 
coherence between sectors has been poor80.”  
9.1.1 Health 
The concern by BSF and Reviewers about the lack of exit strategy was most acute 
for the health sector. Without funding for salaries and supplies, primary health 
facilities close. The Project Memorandum for BSF-2 acknowledged the challenge of 
sustainability, which was to be expected in a post-conflict fragile state. It required an 
exit strategy for all projects, even though this could only be achieved with 
Government support, which was still far from realisation. 
9.1.2 Education 
In education, sustainability has mainly been framed around developing community 
ownership of school infrastructure. There are as yet no GOSS budget lines to further 
support maintenance of school infrastructure, or to support ongoing training through 
CEDs. 
9.1.3 WASH 
Apart from the original construction quality, two critical factors for sustainability are: 
the software process for working with communities. In BSF and in MWRI there is no 
standard approach for the process of introducing and developing a water supply in a 
village. NGO practices varied widely – the more limited approaches are unlikely to 
achieve sustainability.81 
• Maintenance support systems, including supply chains for replacement parts 
for handpumps. Support to communities is unlikely to be achieved until the 
local government system is adequately strengthened.  Market based 
sustainable supply chains will not achievable while UNICEF continues to 
provide free parts.82 
 
The BSF-IA Review found wide variation in the approach and quality of hygiene 
promotion. “Changes in sanitation and hygiene behaviour are unlikely to be 
sustained without further reinforcement of promotion.”83 
 
                                                
80 BSF-2 Project Memorandum. 
81 BSF-IA Review 
82 BSF-1 Review, BSF-IA Review 
83 BSF-IA Review 
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9.2 Extent to which these were addressed by BSF 
There is at present no hard evidence of the sustainability regarding construction 
(health facilities, schools, bore-holes), nor is this easy to get. Anecdotal evidence is 
mixed; reviewers and previous reviews show some instances where constructed 
resources remain relatively well maintained and functional, through community 
ownership and maintenance, and others where resources have quickly fallen into 
disrepair. There is no hard evidence on the relative frequencies of these two 
outcomes, or of how these change over time.  
 
There have been some advances in public sector health structures, including a 
national health sector development plan in 2011, and the installation, with support 
from MDTF and BSF, of a District Health Information System. However, the 2012 
Austerity Budget demonstrates that funding shortages for primary health are still 
critical, and have required BSF to increase funding for staff, transport and medical 
supplies. BSF has not been able to improve medical supply chains: Government 
medical supplies continue to be operated on a “push” system, which takes no 
account of levels of demand from facilities. South Sudan remains critically short of 
health staff with appropriate levels of skill in adequate numbers, and this remains the 
most critical factor for sustainability. 
 
The handover process itself now seems critical for success. NGOs are concerned 
that although preparation by GoSS and BSF started over a year before the planned 
end of BSF-IAe, much still remains to be done. The award of new contracts, 
uncertainty about ownership of assets and payment of salaries could seriously 
damage projects, particularly in health. 
 
There remains no commercial supply chain for maintenance or construction of 
WASH resources.  
9.3 Lessons for the Future 
BSF demonstrates: 
 
• NGOs funded by BSF haves demonstrated good practice in helping their 
projects to achieve sustainability at local level, but the extent of this success 
is uncertain. 
Additional Challenges 
 
Funds need to identify realistic and sustainable resources for the future of the 
structures and services they have funded by 
• Identifying public and private sources of funding 
• Fostering, engaging and building the capacity of community institutions  
  
Programmes need to rely less on unrealistic “exit strategies” and “handover plans”. 
Instead all partners need to put more emphasis on staged processes of developing 
local capacity throughout the life of the programme. There must be allowance for the 
risks that capacity will be imperfect. It cannot be assumed that Governments will 
acquire all the capacities, whether in strategy, staffing, supplies, systems or 
supervision, for successfully underpinning delivery.  
 
Project handovers need to be based on realistic assessments of the effectiveness of 
community management to sustain resources; this also need independent follow-up, 
evaluation and mechanisms of support. 
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Predictability and continuity of funding for basic services is essential for 
sustainability. Uncertainty increases the risk of losing staff, resources and ownership; 
it damages public confidence and service utilisation. Poorly managed handovers also 
jeopardise the learning built up by service providers, fund managers and government 
officials.  
 
10 Provisional Conclusion 
This report cannot convey the wealth of learning accumulated by BSF and its 
partners in Government, NGOs, communities and funding agencies. It can only 
suggest broad lessons in the design of pooled funds and other coordinated 
delivery mechanisms, referred to here as “funding mechanisms”.  
 
We offer the diagram below for considering this.  
• The Landscape is represented by the whole diagram, and is context for the 
funding mechanism. The landscape is one of more or less security and 
stability. The two-way arrow shows that levels of security may change, and 
with that the appropriateness of relief or development. 
• The Funding Mechanism is the dotted box that covers part of this 
landscape. Depending where it is positioned on the landscape, it may be 
better suited for relief or development. 
• The evidence areas examined in this report indicate that funding mechanisms 
need to succeed in three important ways, represented by the ovals:  
• Engaged Stakeholders 
• Performance for Outcomes 
• Sustainability 
 
(As an example, a funding mechanism positioned on the right of the diagram 
may be designed to perform well by using strong government structures, 
whereas one positioned on the left may work well where structures are weak, 
by using its own staff and supply chains.)  
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Understanding the Landscape 
 
The landscape for BSF and for many funds is insecurity and uncertainty, as well as 
hope and opportunity. In South Sudan, the landscape is marked with conflicts, past, 
actual and potential, as well as the prospect of new resources and independence. It 
is important to resist the temptation to identify the insecure/relief period with 
particular historical times, such as the Interim Period between the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement in 2006 and the Referendum in 2011: as 2012 shows, the risk of 
insecurity in the years after conflict remains high84.  
 
The social legacy of conflict, neglect, poverty and expropriation of resources is 
complex and severe, resulting in very low levels of participation in education and 
health services, especially among women.  
 
In this landscape, the growth of services and the capacity to deliver them is 
constrained by a host of factors, including: the poor educational and health status of 
the population; diversity of language and ethnicity; economic and geographical 
adversity; the weakness of existing services and structures; and the limited capacity 
of often new public administration.  
 
While the need for basic services in health education and WASH may be obvious, it 
requires deep understanding to respond appropriately to the specificity of problems 
of very low participation in education and health, or to address the ways that they 
affect women, disabled people, child soldiers, nomads or other groups that suffer 
                                                
84 See, for instance, P Collier The Bottom Billion, 2008 on evidence for the persistence of the 
“conflict trap” following peace. 
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endemic exclusion. 
 
Much of this analysis is unlikely to be available at the outset of a programme, which 
therefore needs to set baselines and also deepen its analysis as the programme 
develops. 
 
Funds like BSF need to strengthen stakeholders, performance and sustainability, 
whether stability or insecurity reigns.  
 
1. Programme development should be informed by analysis of the specific 
drivers of conflict, and should address the problems arising from conflict.  
 
2. Programme development should be informed by analysis of those population 
groups suffering particular exclusion and with specific service needs, for 
instance because of gender, disability, culture or poverty; for instance, gender 
analysis should include a baseline of women and girls’ need and concerns, 
including gender based violence, and should address issues of women’s 
ownership of and decision-making in service design and delivery.  
Funding Mechanisms 
 
Funding mechanisms (represented by the dotted outline in the diagram) are 
positioned between relief and development, sometimes leaning more to relief, 
sometimes more toward development. Their position is influenced by their objectives, 
design, stakeholders and length of operation. BSF demonstrated that short-term 
programmes can deliver service outputs. However, the short-term nature of the 
programme reduced the scope of the programme to develop local capacity to lead 
and sustain these.  
 
Programme design cannot presume that society is making a one-way transition from 
a “relief” environment to a “development” environment. It needs to be able to adapt to 
setbacks such as insecurity.  
 
3. Funding mechanisms need a clear theory of change that shows how they will 
achieve their planned outcomes and outputs within the period of funding. The 
theory needs to show not only achievable outcomes for service delivery; it 
also needs achievable outcomes for institutional capacity development. 
Engaged Stakeholders 
 
BSF shows that stakeholders can be engaged even in relief mode. Engagement of 
stakeholders cannot be contingent on a high level of developed structures, which are 
subject to setbacks and delays. They therefore need to help stakeholders build 
capacity and structures step-by step. 
 
4. Funding mechanisms need to work within the strengths and constraints of all 
stakeholders, including emergent structures of government.   
 
5. Funding mechanisms need to work towards fulfilling Government aspirations 
for control, whilst managing the inherent risks to service delivery and Value 
for Money.  
 
6. Funding mechanisms therefore need to evolve explicit enabling steps to 
achieve the competencies and structures required for transfer of ownership, 
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strategic and operational decision-making, and budgetary control, from the 
funder and NGOs, to local stakeholders. 
Performance for Outcomes 
 
BSF demonstrated strong performance in delivering outputs. However, whether 
short-term or long-term, performance needs to focus on outcomes as well as outputs. 
Measuring outputs in terms of teachers trained, patient consultations and waterpoints 
constructed does not demonstrate improvements in education, health or hygiene, 
which depend on other factors including analysis of need, ownership, supporting 
systems. Nor is it possible to assess the value for money provided without 
understanding the economic value of outcomes. 
 
The costs of short-term programmes remain high because it is hard for funds to 
address major cost drivers, such as skill shortages, inefficient supply chains, and 
inappropriate materials. International NGOs and the funding mechanism itself can 
also result in duplication of government management systems. Only strategic 
investment over the longer term can drive these costs down. 
 
7. A funding mechanism’s theory of change needs to show how performance in 
outputs of service translate into achievable and clearly measured outcomes 
 
8. Performance assessment needs to embrace capacity development as fully as 
service delivery. 
 
9. Funding mechanisms need to demonstrate the economic benefits of their 
outcomes, in order to assess value for money. 
 
10. Funding mechanisms need to make longer term investments to break out of 
the high costs of short-term programmes. They need to address major cost 
drivers, particularly in human resources, supply chains, development 
technologies, and duplication of management. 
Sustainability 
 
BSF has demonstrated that even in challenging circumstances well-designed 
projects can promote engagement, ownership and sustainability, particularly at the 
local level. It has been hard, however, to set realistic exit strategies and handover 
plans within the timeframe of funding. 
 
11. Funds need to identify realistic and sustainable resources for the future of the 
structures and services they have funded, by identifying public sources of 
funding and building the capacity of community institutions  
 
12. Funds need to put less reliance on exit strategies, and more emphasis on 
staged development processes of local capacity throughout the programme.  
 
13. Predictability and continuity of funding for basic services is essential for 
sustainability. Uncertainty risks loss of services, capacity and learning.  
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Annex 1: Extracts from Terms of Reference 
 
HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE BASIC SERVICES FUND (BSF) 
 
DfID South Sudan 
30th September 2012 
 
. . . 
 
Objective 
 
The purpose of this review is to: 
 
Provide lessons to DFID and other stakeholders in the design of future pooled funds and 
coordinated delivery mechanisms. The lessons will take account of evidence on 
 
-  the interaction with a range of different stakeholders including bodies of the 
Government of the Republic of South Sudan in the design and implementation of the 
Programme 
- the gender sensitivity of the Programme 
- how far the historical design and implementation of the programme has supported the 
transition from relief to development, specifically the systems strengthening 
component 
- programme performance in meeting targets; accomplishing key objectives; and 
achieving intended programme impact. This will include reasons for over- or under-
performance. 
- whether the Programme ‘did no harm’ in geographical areas prone to conflict 
- the value for money achieved by the Programme 
- the sustainability of BSF supported facilities and systems following the conclusion of 
BSF support 
 
The recipient 
 
The primary recipient of this technical assistance (TA) will be DFID who will seek to learn 
lessons from this review for the preparation of similar pooled funds and co- ordination 
mechanisms for service delivery. Other stakeholders will include the Government of the 
Republic of South Sudan (at central, State and county levels- particularly the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning, and responsible line ministries; co-donors of the Basic 
Services Fund; the Fund Managers BMB Mott MacDonald; NGOs engaged in service 
delivery, and community organisations representing the recipients of basic services on the 
ground. The Review report will also be made publicly available on the central DFID web site    
 
Scope 
 
The Review will span the implementation from its inception in January 2006 to the mid- term 
point of the current final one year extension (30 June 2012).  
 
Method 
 
The study will draw on existing analysis and the findings of focused learning exercises with 
stakeholders. 
 
The consultancy will be provided by evaluators for the education, WATSAN and health 
sectors. Visits to South Sudan will undertaken by the education and health evaluators only. 
 
The consultants will: 
Conduct a summary desk review of all relevant project, sector and GRSS documents with a 
particular focus on preparatory documents, annual and project completion reports produced 
by the Fund Manager; and DFID annual reviews and case studies. The BSF-IA mid-term 
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review may also be used as a source document 
 
Conduct a survey based on a questionnaire of the grant recipients of BSF-1,2, IA and IAe .  
 
Engage with the following stakeholders, as far as possible engaging those involved in the 
programme from its conception, in the context of the CPA and the MDTF: 
- all Steering Committee member institutions;  
- relevant line ministries at State and County levels;  
- DFID and the co donors over the duration of the Programme;  
- Other stakeholders engaged in the design of the BSF and MDTF, including 
Government/SPLM and UN organisations 
- NGOs engaged in programme design and delivery 
- Selected representatives of community organisations engaged in programme design 
and delivery 
 
Engagements with stakeholders should include	  
- An initial meeting with Steering committee Chair 
- a visit to two counties in two States where BSF projects have been provided, for 
meetings with state, county and other stakeholders, but not including project visits 
- a workshop or discussion with up to 18 national stakeholders 	  
- A meeting with the Steering Committee meeting for feedback, discussion and 
summary (Friday am)	  
 
Individual interviews will focus on a small number of key stakeholders, whose views cannot 
be adequately gained in group settings. 	  
 
. . .  
 
Outputs 
 
Outputs will include but not be limited to the following: 
 
-  A report of up to 30 Pages (not including attachments) providing an analytic overview 
of Fund’s performance over the duration of the Programme focusing on the Objective 
above, and a summary of conclusions on lessons that could be applied to the 
reparation by DFID or other donors of other pooled fund programmes 
  
-   A power point of not more than 12 slides summarising the conclusions of the report. 
 
Reporting 
 
The consultants will report to Simon Williams, Deputy Programme Manager DFID South 
Sudan Basic Services Team. Caroline Wangeci Dale (Results adviser), Dr Jay Bagaria 
(senior health adviser) and Richard Arden (senior Education adviser) should also be copied in 
on reports. 
 
Timeframe 
 
The initial assignment will be for up to 30 days. There will be a field visit between 4 to 9 
November. Final products (See Outputs above) will be submitted no later than 8 February 
2013. This will assist DFID with the production of a Project Completion Report by 31 March 
2013.   
 
The evaluation team will be invited to present the conclusions of the Review to DFID South 
Sudan and the Fund Manager and the BSF Steering Committee in power point format before 
the formal conclusion of the assignment. 
 
DFID coordination 
 
Simon Williams will act as the lead DFID officer for this assignment.  For more 
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detailed discussions on compliance with DFID procedures, the consultant should 
work closely with Simon Williams and other members of DFID South Sudan 
Programme Team.   
 
DFID with support from Mott Macdonald will be responsible for logistics, including 
transport, meeting arrangements and invitations, research documents and contacts 
for the survey, in discussion with the consultants. 
 
. . .  
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Annex 2: People met 
Moses Mabior Director Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning 
Charles Chol Deputy Director Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning 
John •  Ministry of Education 
George •  Ministry of Education 
Hamish Falconer Programme Manager DFID, South Sudan 
Simon Williams Deputy Programme Manager DFID, South Sudan 
Jay Bagaria Health Advisor DFID, South Sudan 
Moses Kamanga Assistant Programme 
Manager 
DFID, South Sudan 
Richard Arden Senior Education Adviser DFID, South Sudan 
Wim Groenendijk M&E Primary Health BMB Mott MacDonald 
Caroline d’Anna M&E Primary Education BMB Mott MacDonald 
Kate Louwes Team Leader BMB Mott MacDonald 
Patricia Schwerzel Senior Health Adviser BMB Mott MacDonald 
Geertruid Kortmann Health Consultant BMB Mott MacDonald 
Fiona Bailey Database Administrator BMB Mott MacDonald 
Hannan Yousif Senior Health Adviser BMB Mott MacDonald 
Lucie Leclert WASH Monitor BMB Mott MacDonald 
Nick Helton Coordinator NGO Forum   
Ruth Goehle Coordinator NGO Health Forum 
Claudia Futterknecht Country Director 
And NGO Forum Steering 
Committee representative 
CARE International 
Fay Ballard Assistant Country Director, 
Programmes 
GOAL 
Alan Glasgow Head of Business 
Development 
GOAL 
Wycliffe Kyamanya Area Coordinator, Malakal Tearfund 
Sarah Williams Health Transition Tearfund 
Lawrence Owich Assistant Area Health 
Manager 
Goal 
Doboul Gatluak Kuosh Executive Director Kodok 
Onoic Adyeng Kathiken Clinical Officer CHD Fashuda 
Arben Oyay Mayik District Coordinator RRC Fashuda 
John Joshua Dok Medical Director CHD Balliet 
Shadrack Nduati Deputy CST Leader IMA 
Rita Akwod Ayong Acting Director General  State Ministry of Health, 
Upper Nile 
Mayak Maluk CHD Officer CHD Melut 
Joseph Akouckak CHD Officer CHD Manyo 
Derek O’Rourke Area Coordinator, Sobat GOAL, Baliet 
James Amum CHD CHD Manyo 
Baibin Joseph Health Coordinator IMA Manyo/Melut 
Keleta Abraham Programme Manager Oxfam, Upper Nile 
Tewodros Gebremichael Country Director Merlin 
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Annex 3: Southern Sudan Timeline 
 
 
Politics and Government Selected events BSF 
1885 Mahdi drives out Ottoman-
Egyptian rule and declares 
Islamic state 
1892-4 Famine, conflict and 
epidemics kill half population 
 
1899 British and Egyptian forces 
replace Mahdi with 
Condominium 
  
1955 Northern Sudanese take 
over South after mutiny 
  
1956 Sudanese independence: 
First North-South civil war 
  
1972 Addis Ababa Agreement 
ends first civil war 
  
1983 New civil war following 
Islamic Revolution; 1987, 1995-
9, 2003-4 Darfur rebellion,   
1983-4 Northern Famine 
1988-9 Southern Famine 
 
2001 Peace negotiations win 
relation to Darfur, Nuba 
Mountains and South 
2000 deaths in localised 
conflicts, mainly Jonglei 
2004 Workshop for BSF 
2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement: start of agreed 6 
year Interim Period until 2011 
referendum 
 
. Continuing conflict in Darfur 
 
2007 Line ministries initiated 
 
2007 Ministry of Health 
established 
 2006-8 
BSF-1 
2009 Local Government Act 
starts decentralization 
 
2010 Election of Salva Kir as 
President of Southern Sudan 
 2009-2010 
BSF-2 
2011Referendum and 
Independence for South Sudan 
  
2011 Sudan bombs and 
occupies Abyei 
 2010-2011 
BSF-IA 
2012 Austerity budget following 
interruption of oil exports 
2012 over 100,000 refugees and 
IDPs arrive in border 
2012-2012 
BSF-IAe 
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Annex 4: Key documents 
Reviews of BSF 
Morton J Denny R, ‘Review of the Basic Services Fund, South Sudan’, Triple Line 
2008 (BSF Review 2008) 
 
Morton J Denny R Lisok R, ‘Review of the Basic Services Fund, South Sudan, Triple 
Line 2009 (BSF Review 2009) 
 
Ockelford J, R Johnson R, Power T, ‘Basic Services Fund Interim Arrangement Mid-
Term Review’ (BSF Review 2011), DewPoint 2011  
BSF Learning Exercises 
‘Capacity Building and Basic Services in Primary Health, Primary Education and 
Water & Sanitation’, BSF, Mott MacDonald 2010 
 
Hutton, ‘Review of support provided by BSF grantees to County Health 
Departments’, 2012 
 
‘Case Study – Millennium Development Goals Southern Sudan’, BSF 2009 
 
Salih M K, ‘Gender Equality Assessment of the Basic Services Fund (BSF) in 
Southern Sudan Phase II’, CIDA 2008 
 
‘Draft Report on the Second Government of Southern Sudan Health Assembly  
‘ Building Effective Health Systems’’, BSF 2008 
 
Operti P ‘Consolidated Report on Peer Review of BSF-Grant Recipients in Primary 
Health, BMB Mott MacDonald, 2009 
 
Operti P ‘Consolidated Report on 10 Peer Reviews of BSF-2-Grant Recipients in 
Primary Health Care, BMB Mott MacDonald, 2011 
 
BMB Mott MacDonald (2009). Borehole siting, borehole drilling, borehole  
rehabilitation and borehole contract management: Evaluation of Best Practices in 
BSF Project Area, Southern Sudan – Draft, Basic Services Fund (BSF) for Southern 
Sudan. 
 
BMB Mott MacDonald (2012). ‘Status Review of BSF’s borehole drilling component 
in South Sudan (2006-2012)’, Draft Report 
 
BSF Programme Design  
Project Memorandum Basic Services Fund (BSF) for South Sudan (BSF-1 PM) DFID 
 
Project Memorandum for the Basic Services Fund (BSF-2 PM) DFID 
 
Project Memorandum Basic Services Fund Interim Activities (BSF-IA PM), DFID 
 
Business Case and Intervention Summary; South Sudan Basic Services Fund 2012’, 
(BSF-IAe BC) 
Progress and Completion Reports  
‘QPR 4 of 2007 and QPR 1 of 2008’, BSF 2008 (BSF-1 Completion Report), BSF 
2008 
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‘Completion Report Southern Sudan: Fund Management of the Basic Services Fund 
Phase 2, 2009-2010’ (BSF-2 Completion Report), BSF 2010 
 
 ‘BSF-IA Completion Report’, BSF 2012 
 
‘BSF-IA Extension Quarterly Progress Report 3 of 2012 1st July-30th September 
2012’, (draft) BSF 9 November 2012 (BSF-IAe QPR3), BSF 2012 
 
‘BSF-IAe Inception Report’, BSF 2012 
Government of South Sudan 
‘Basic Package of Health Services’ MoH 2009 
 
‘Priority Indicators for Routine Monthly Report 2011’ MoH 2011 
Context 
Natsios A S, Sudan, South Sudan, & Darfur What everyone needs to know, OUP 
2012 
 
J Bennet et al ‘Aiding the Peace: A multi-donor evaluation of support to Conflict 
Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 2005-2010’, ITAD 2010 
 ‘Joint Assessment Mission Sudan’ Volumes I-III, World Bank & United Nations, 2005 
 
Maxwell D et al, Livelihoods, basic services and social protection in South Sudan 
Working Paper 1’ Feinstein Centre  2012 
 
Downie R, ‘The state of Public Health in South Sudan, Critical Condition’, CSIS 2012 
 
Baingana F,  I Bannon and R Thomas, Mental Health and Conflicts: Conceptual 
Framework and Approaches, World Bank, 2005 
 
van Omeron et al. 2005, Mental and social health during and after acute 
emergencies: emerging consensus?, ,  
 
C Lund et al. Poverty and mental disorders: breaking the cycle in low-income and 
middle-income countries, The Lancet 2011 
 
Cleaver F, 2011, Case Study: Southern Sudan, in State-Building, Peace-Building and 
Service Delivery in Fragile and Conflict-affected States, Practical Action, Save the 
Children, CfTB 
 
